Two Person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information

Author : Bettina Kuon
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642487777
Total Pages : 305 pages
Book Rating : 4.74/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information written by Bettina Kuon and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 305 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

Author : John C. Harsanyi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 106 pages
Book Rating : 4.77/5 ( download)

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Download or read book A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information written by John C. Harsanyi and published by . This book was released on 1966 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Author : Robert J. Aumann
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262011471
Total Pages : 372 pages
Book Rating : 4.76/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.

Author : A.E. Roth
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642515703
Total Pages : 129 pages
Book Rating : 4.05/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Axiomatic Models of Bargaining written by A.E. Roth and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 129 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.

Author : Alvin E. Roth
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 0521267579
Total Pages : 402 pages
Book Rating : 4.71/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1985-11-29 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

Author : James E. Parco
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9781423509103
Total Pages : 246 pages
Book Rating : 4.02/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Two-Person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by James E. Parco and published by . This book was released on 2002-05-01 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: New theoretical developments and recent experimental studies involving the sealed-bid kappa-double auction mechanism for bilateral bargaining under incomplete information have raised new questions about procedures that induce efficient bargaining behavior and about the applicability of extant adaptive learning models. It is now generally accepted that a theory of bargaining behavior for individuals who typically do not meet the stringent assumptions about common knowledge of rationality cannot be complete without systematic empirical investigations of the properties of the various mechanisms that structure bargaining. The aim of this dissertation is to critically explore the extent to which efficient bargaining outcomes can be achieved while dynamically accounting for individual behavior across repeated play of the game. In the first study, an endogenous bonus is introduced into the baseline single- stage game. Although theoretically doing so induces truth-telling behavior for both players, the experimental data provide very limited support. In the second study, the baseline game is extended by incorporating an additional, costless period of bargaining, thereby giving players an increased opportunity to reveal information about their respective reservation values. The data show that subjects quickly learn not to reveal information about their private valuation despite the increased opportunity to bilaterally improve efficiency. Finally, the third study investigates behavior sensitivity to variation in the trading parameter, kappa. Instead of following the historical precedent of setting kappa = 1/2, extreme values of kappa are invoked in an asymmetric information environment endowing a player with exclusive price-setting power.

Author : D. Marc Kilgour
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 9048190975
Total Pages : 473 pages
Book Rating : 4.73/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation written by D. Marc Kilgour and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2010-08-02 with total page 473 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Publication of the Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation marks a milestone in the evolution of the group decision and negotiation (GDN) eld. On this occasion, editors Colin Eden and Marc Kilgour asked me to write a brief history of the eld to provide background and context for the volume. They said that I am in a good position to do so: Actively involved in creating the GDN Section and serving as its chair; founding and leading the GDN journal, Group Decision and Negotiation as editor-in-chief, and the book series, “Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation” as editor; and serving as general chair of the GDN annual meetings. I accepted their invitation to write a brief history. In 1989 what is now the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) established its Section on Group Decision and Negotiation. The journal Group Decision and Negotiation was founded in 1992, published by Springer in cooperation with INFORMS and the GDN Section. In 2003, as an ext- sion of the journal, the Springer book series, “Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation” was inaugurated.

Author : Dionysius Glycopantis
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3540269797
Total Pages : 656 pages
Book Rating : 4.93/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Differential Information Economies written by Dionysius Glycopantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-12-28 with total page 656 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

Author : Peter B. Linhart
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 576 pages
Book Rating : 4.25/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Peter B. Linhart and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.

Author : Harold William Kuhn
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 1400829151
Total Pages : 328 pages
Book Rating : 4.56/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Classics in Game Theory written by Harold William Kuhn and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2020-11-10 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.