Moral Error Theory

Download Moral Error Theory PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0198701934
Total Pages : 226 pages
Book Rating : 4.34/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Moral Error Theory by : Jonas Olson

Download or read book Moral Error Theory written by Jonas Olson and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2014 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Moral Error Theory

Download Moral Error Theory PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3319772880
Total Pages : 246 pages
Book Rating : 4.82/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Moral Error Theory by : Wouter Floris Kalf

Download or read book Moral Error Theory written by Wouter Floris Kalf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-05-30 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.

A World Without Values

Download A World Without Values PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 9048133394
Total Pages : 254 pages
Book Rating : 4.90/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis A World Without Values by : Richard Joyce

Download or read book A World Without Values written by Richard Joyce and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-12-01 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What kind of properties are moral qualities, such as rightness, badness, etc? Some ethicists doubt that there are any such properties; they maintain that thinking that something is morally wrong (for example) is comparable to thinking that something is a unicorn or a ghost. These "moral error theorists" argue that the world simply does not contain the kind of properties or objects necessary to render our moral judgments true. This radical form of moral skepticism was championed by the philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981). This anthology is a collection of philosophical essays critically examining Mackie’s view.

Moral Fictionalism

Download Moral Fictionalism PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0199275971
Total Pages : 206 pages
Book Rating : 4.77/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Moral Fictionalism by : Mark Eli Kalderon

Download or read book Moral Fictionalism written by Mark Eli Kalderon and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2005-04-14 with total page 206 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions - propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as somethingto be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical.There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is aclaim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism - the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms'noncognitivism' and 'nonfactualism' have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism, moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking butis the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.

Unbelievable Errors

Download Unbelievable Errors PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0191088951
Total Pages : 256 pages
Book Rating : 4.57/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Unbelievable Errors by : Bart Streumer

Download or read book Unbelievable Errors written by Bart Streumer and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2017-08-11 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.

Ethics

Download Ethics PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Penguin UK
ISBN 13 : 0141960094
Total Pages : 256 pages
Book Rating : 4.98/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Ethics by : J.L. Mackie

Download or read book Ethics written by J.L. Mackie and published by Penguin UK. This book was released on 1990-08-30 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity.

Morality and Epistemic Judgment

Download Morality and Epistemic Judgment PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN 13 : 0198842732
Total Pages : 245 pages
Book Rating : 4.36/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Morality and Epistemic Judgment by : Christopher Cowie

Download or read book Morality and Epistemic Judgment written by Christopher Cowie and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2019-10-23 with total page 245 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.

Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics

Download Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Routledge
ISBN 13 : 042984641X
Total Pages : 224 pages
Book Rating : 4.10/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics by : Christopher Cowie

Download or read book Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics written by Christopher Cowie and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2019-09-24 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a ‘companion’, and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge. Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.

The Myth of Morality

Download The Myth of Morality PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1139430939
Total Pages : 265 pages
Book Rating : 4.37/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis The Myth of Morality by : Richard Joyce

Download or read book The Myth of Morality written by Richard Joyce and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001-11-22 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we did away with other faulty notions such as witches? Possibly not. We may be able to carry on with morality as a 'useful fiction' - allowing it to have a regulative influence on our lives and decisions, perhaps even playing a central role - while not committing ourselves to believing or asserting falsehoods, and thus not being subject to accusations of 'error'.

The Normative Web

Download The Normative Web PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Clarendon Press
ISBN 13 : 0191614815
Total Pages : 272 pages
Book Rating : 4.11/5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis The Normative Web by : Terence Cuneo

Download or read book The Normative Web written by Terence Cuneo and published by Clarendon Press. This book was released on 2010-03-04 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.