Litigation And Settlement In A Game With Incomplete Information

Author : Wolfgang Ryll
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642614671
Total Pages : 177 pages
Book Rating : 4.75/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information written by Wolfgang Ryll and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 177 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.

Author : Wolfgang Ryll
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9783642614682
Total Pages : 190 pages
Book Rating : 4.8X/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information written by Wolfgang Ryll and published by . This book was released on 1996-07-12 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Author : Stephen W. Salant
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 34 pages
Book Rating : 4.95/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Litigation of Questioned Settlement Claims written by Stephen W. Salant and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Before reforms in legal procedures are implemented, their consequences should be thoroughly explored. In this paper, the authors present a methodology for evaluating the consequences of changes in legal procedures. They consider legal settlements of personal injury disputes. Even though there are assumed to exist out-of-court settlements which both plaintiff and defendant would prefer to a court fight if they had complete information, such settlements may fail to occur because the defendant lacks complete information about the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and sometimes challenges demands he suspects to be inflated. The authors treat adversarial behavior in the settlement process as the strategic interaction of players in a game of incomplete information. To illustrate the value of the methodology, the authors conclude by showing how a seemingly innocuous exogenous change in legal procedures has a surprising qualitative effect on the behavior of defendants and consequently on how frequently cases go to trial.

Author : Kalyan Chatterjee
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 1461470951
Total Pages : 407 pages
Book Rating : 4.53/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Game Theory and Business Applications written by Kalyan Chatterjee and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-26 with total page 407 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game theory has been applied to a growing list of practical problems, from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The purpose of Game Theory and Business Applications is to show how game theory can be used to model and analyze business decisions. The contents of this revised edition contain a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to operations, from marketing to strategy to organizational design. In addition, specific application areas include market competition, law and economics, bargaining and dispute resolution, and competitive bidding. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings, specifically situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their own self-interests and in accordance with the institutional “rules of the game” take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. As this volume demonstrates, game theory provides a compelling guide for analyzing business decisions and strategies.

Author : Ulrich Schwalbe
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642584772
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.70/5 ( download)

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Download or read book The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information written by Ulrich Schwalbe and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.

Author : Daniel Friedman
Publisher : Psychology Press
ISBN 13 : 9780415324021
Total Pages : 254 pages
Book Rating : 4.25/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Economics Lab written by Daniel Friedman and published by Psychology Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook sketches the history of experimental economics before moving on to describe how to set up an economics experiment and to survey selected applications and the latest methods.

Author : Dr Jimmy Teng
Publisher : Chartridge Books Oxford
ISBN 13 : 1909287768
Total Pages : 108 pages
Book Rating : 4.61/5 ( download)

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Download or read book A Bayesian Theory of Games written by Dr Jimmy Teng and published by Chartridge Books Oxford. This book was released on 2013-10-01 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Summary A Bayesian Theory of Games introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium concept: Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). The new equilibrium concept achieves consistencies in results among different types of games that current games theory at times fails to. BEIC requires players to make predictions on the strategies of other players starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with Bayesian statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, conjectures are consistent with the equilibrium or equilibriums they supported and so rationality is achieved for actions, strategies and beliefs and (statistical) decision rule. Given its ability to typically select only a unique equilibrium in games, the BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current games theory, including games with noisy inaccurate observations and games with multiple sided incomplete information games. Key Features Provides a unified and consistent analysis of many categories of games. Its solution algorithm is iterative and has good computation properties. Can analyze more types of games than current existing games theory. The equilibrium concept and solution algorithm are based on Bayesian statistical decision theory. In the new equilibrium, rationality is achieved for action, strategy, belief (both prior and posterior) and decision rule. Beliefs are the results of optimization exercises of players. Uses first order uninformative conjectures and reaction functions to derive higher and higher orders of conjectures until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. Has great application value for it could solve many types of games and could model beliefs. The Author Dr Jimmy Teng currently teaches at the School of Economics of the University of Nottingham (Malaysia Campus). He is the author of many articles and two books. He received his economics PhD from the University of Toronto. He also earned a PhD in political Science and a MS in statistics from Duke University. He previously held research and teaching positions in Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University and Nanyang Technological University Readership Games theorists, decision theorists, economists, mathematicians, statisticians, operational researchers, social scientists, management researchers, public policy researchers, computer scientists Contents Preface Acknowledgments About the author Introduction Sequential games with incomplete information and noisy inaccurate observation; introduction; an inflationary game; Bayesian iterative conjectures algorithm as a Bayes decision rule; conclusions Sequential games with perfect and imperfect information; introduction; the Bayesian iterative conjecture algorithm, sub-game perfect equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium; solving sequential games of incomplete and perfect information; multiple-sided incomplete information sequential games with perfect information; conclusions Simultaneous games; introduction; complete information simultaneous games; BEIC and refinements of Nash equilibrium; simultaneous games with incomplete information; conclusions Conclusions References Index

Author : University of Chicago Law Review
Publisher : Quid Pro Books
ISBN 13 : 1610278771
Total Pages : 387 pages
Book Rating : 4.75/5 ( download)

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Download or read book University of Chicago Law Review: Symposium - Revelation Mechanisms and the Law written by University of Chicago Law Review and published by Quid Pro Books. This book was released on 2014-03-23 with total page 387 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first issue of 2014 features articles and essays from internationally recognized legal and economics scholars, including an extensive Symposium on "Revelation Mechanisms and the Law." Topics include voting options and strategies to reveal preferences, corporate governance, regulatory intensity, tort calculations of risk, mandatory disclosure of choices, partitioning interests in land, and shopping for expert witnesses. In addition, Issue 1 includes an article, "Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law," by Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams. Applications include smoking bans and seat belt laws. Also included is a student Comment, "Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments," by Channing J. Turner; and a Book Review, "Common Good and Common Ground: The Inevitability of Fundamental Disagreement," by Rebecca L. Brown, reviewing Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The issue serves, in effect, as a new and extensive book on cutting-edge issues of revelation mechanisms, strategies, prompts, nudges, and effects. The Symposium's contents are: * "Governing Communities by Auction," by Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky * "Partition and Revelation," by Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell * "Savage Tables and Tort Law: An Alternative to the Precaution Model," by Janet M. Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod * "Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models," by Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum * "The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems," by Richard A. Epstein * "Expert Mining and Required Disclosure," by Jonah B. Gelbach * "Renegotiation Design by Contract," by Richard Holden & Anup Malani * "Audits as Signals," by Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach & Richard J. Zeckhauser * "Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock," by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier * "From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities," by Saul Levmore * "Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance," by Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl * "The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements," by Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston Quality ebook formatting includes active TOC, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and all the charts, tables, and formulae found in the original print version.

Author : Werner Krabs
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642189733
Total Pages : 198 pages
Book Rating : 4.39/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Analysis, Controllability and Optimization of Time-Discrete Systems and Dynamical Games written by Werner Krabs and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Focuses on the analysis, optimization and controllability of time-discrete dynamical systems and games under the aspect of stability, controllability and (for games) cooperative and non-cooperative treatment. The investigation of stability is based on Lyapunov's method which is generalized to non-autonomous systems. Optimization and controllability of dynamical systems is treated, among others, with the aid of mapping theorems such as implicit function theorem and inverse mapping theorem. Dynamical games are treated as cooperative and non-cooperative games and are used in order to deal with the problem of carbon dioxide reduction under economic aspects. The theoretical results are demonstrated by various applications.

Author : Andrey Garnaev
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642573045
Total Pages : 157 pages
Book Rating : 4.40/5 ( download)

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Download or read book Search Games and Other Applications of Game Theory written by Andrey Garnaev and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 157 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is on applications of game theory. The title of this book is not "Game Theory and its Applications" because it does not construct a general theory for considered games. The book contains a lot of examples of applica tion of game theory together with the background of those games considered and a list of unsolved problems. Also we consider only the game where the optimal strategies of the players are found in closed form. This book is an attempt to carryon the approach developed in nice books "Search Games" by Gal and "Geometric Games and their Applications" by Ruckle. The first chapter of this book supplies the required definitions and theorems from game theory. The second chapter deals with discrete search games where both players act simultaneously: the games of protection of a channel from infiltration of a submarine, the submarine versus helicopter game, the matrix search games and others. The third chapter considers the game where the players allocate their contin uous efforts. In these games players face up an alternative either not to come into contest if the cost of efforts seems too high, or come into it. In the last case the player have to decide how much resources they can afford to spend. The allocation models of search, antiballistic protection and marketing are investigated.