Download Conditionality And Debt Relief full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Conditionality And Debt Relief ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author : Stijn Claessens
Publisher : World Bank Publications
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 49 pages
Book Rating : 4./5 ( download)
Download or read book Conditionality and Debt Relief written by Stijn Claessens and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1989 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Oliver Morrissey
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9789291901272
Total Pages : 17 pages
Book Rating : 4.7X/5 ( download)
Download or read book Making Debt Relief Conditionality Pro-poor written by Oliver Morrissey and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jeffrey D. Sachs
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 59 pages
Book Rating : 4.76/5 ( download)
Download or read book Conditionality, debt relief, and the developing country debt crisis written by Jeffrey D. Sachs and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jeffrey Sachs
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 86 pages
Book Rating : 4.65/5 ( download)
Download or read book Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis written by Jeffrey Sachs and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper raises several cautionary notes regarding high-conditionality lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the context of international debt crisis. It is argued that the role for high-conditionality lending is more restricted than generally believed, because enforcement of conditionality is rather weak. Moreover, the incentives for a country to abide by conditionality terms are also likely to be reduced by a large overhang of external indebtedness. Given the limited ability to enforce conditionality agreements, modesty and realism should be a cornerstone of each program. The experience with conditionality suggests two major lessons for the design of high-conditionality lending. First, debt forgiveness rather than mere debt rescheduling may increase a debtor country's compliance with conditionality, and thereby increase the actual stream of repayments by the indebted countries. Second, given the complexity of the needed adjustments, and the difficulty of enforcing conditionality agreements, programs are most likely to be successful when macroeconomic stabilization is given priority over large-scale liberalization.
Author : Mr.Rodney Ramcharan
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
ISBN 13 : 1451859783
Total Pages : 26 pages
Book Rating : 4.82/5 ( download)
Download or read book Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality written by Mr.Rodney Ramcharan and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2003-09-01 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In principle, international financial institutions (IFIs) can use their leverage as creditors to prompt governments to undertake policy reform. Yet such lending has been frequently linked to unsustainable debt levels and little reform. This paper illustrates how the dual roles of IFIs as purveyors of credit and monitors of reform may help explain these negative outcomes. When debt levels rise, the IFIs reforms goals may become subordinated to its creditor's interest, compromising the enforcement of conditionality. Attracted by this prospect, malevolent governments strategically reform, enhancing their reputation in order to maintain lending and build their debt stock. Once debt levels are sufficiently large, such governments can stop policy reforms, assured that lending will continue.
Download or read book Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis written by and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Celine Tan
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9789832729853
Total Pages : 24 pages
Book Rating : 4.58/5 ( download)
Download or read book Debt and conditionality : Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and opportunities for expanding policy space written by Celine Tan and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jeffrey Sachs
Publisher : World Bank Publications
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 64 pages
Book Rating : 4./5 ( download)
Download or read book efficient debt reduction written by Jeffrey Sachs and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1989 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Debt reduction poses collective action problems that cannot be efficiently handled in the framework of voluntary market-based approaches. Instead we need concerted debt restructuring, based on below-market interest rates -- perhaps linked with credit enhancement by official creditors -- to provide the most direct mechanism for efficient, equitable sharing of losses.
Author : John Williamson
Publisher : Peterson Institute
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 98 pages
Book Rating : 4.42/5 ( download)
Download or read book Voluntary Approaches to Debt Relief written by John Williamson and published by Peterson Institute. This book was released on 1989 with total page 98 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Tito Cordella
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.12/5 ( download)
Download or read book Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs written by Tito Cordella and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2002-07 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing."
